[colug-432] New root exploit code for CentOS

Joshua Kramer joskra42.list at gmail.com
Tue May 14 13:37:55 EDT 2013


"With the right profiles, a major selling point of SELinux (as "we" use
it) is that it's *not* game over just because you got root."

In theory it shouldn't be.  Running processes have contexts attached to
them; this article I wrote a few years ago explains:

http://www.packtpub.com/article/selinux-secured-web-hosting-python-based-web-applications

Essentially, each running process has a context attached to it.  Even if
the process elevates to root privilege (i.e. running a SUID executable,
having exploit code such as we see here, etc.), the OS sees that the
process has a certain context and denies permission for stuff it shouldn't
have.  In the example I used in the article, a SUID root executable copies
/etc/shadow when it is run from a website that has ostensibly been cracked.
 When SELinux is disabled, this works.  When SELinux is enabled, the OS
says, "Hey HTTPD, I don't care if you say you're root, you can't touch
/etc/shadow!"  I never thought to attempt to set /selinux/enforcing to 0
and then attempt that... but I'd hope that the OS would say, "Hey HTTPD, I
don't care if you say you're root, you can't touch /selinux/enforcing!"



On Tue, May 14, 2013 at 1:22 PM, Rick Troth <rmt at casita.net> wrote:

> > Not sure what is interesting about the ability to disable SELinux; you
> have root, game over.
>
> With the right profiles, a major selling point of SELinux (as "we" use
> it) is that it's *not* game over just because you got root.  (There
> are other features of SELinux which are more interesting to the NSA
> than they are to you and me.)
>
> I'm not personally a fan, but I'm not using this as an opportunity to
> jab at it ... or maybe I am.
>
> -- R; <><
>
>
>
>
> On Tue, May 14, 2013 at 1:00 PM, Neal Dias <roman at ensecure.org> wrote:
> > Not sure what is interesting about the ability to disable SELinux; you
> have
> > root, game over.
> >
> > RHEL 5 is not affected, RHEL 6 is, updated packages still in-process.
> >
> > https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2013-2094
> > https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=962792
> >
> > On Tue, May 14, 2013 at 12:33 PM, Joshua Kramer <joskra42.list at gmail.com
> >
> > wrote:
> >>
> >> Hello,
> >>
> >> I recently saw this:
> >>
> >>
> https://www.centos.org/modules/newbb/viewtopic.php?topic_id=42827&forum=59
> >>
> >> Given a command prompt, download this exploit, compile it, run it... and
> >> you suddenly have root.  What is interesting about this is, as soon as
> you
> >> have root, you can disable SELinux.
> >>
> >> Apparently it can be mitigated using this kernel module:
> >>
> >> http://elrepo.org/tiki/kmod-tpe
> >>
> >> I spun up a test VM and tested this - it works!  What would be
> interesting
> >> is doing some investigation to see if SELinux could prevent damage if
> this
> >> code was run from a malicious web app instead of the command prompt.
> >>
> >> Also, I wonder if this works on Scientific Linux and other RHEL
> >> derivatives, or RHEL itself?
> >>
> >> Cheers,
> >> -JK
> >>
> >> _______________________________________________
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> >> colug-432 at colug.net
> >> http://lists.colug.net/mailman/listinfo/colug-432
> >>
> >
> >
> > _______________________________________________
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> > http://lists.colug.net/mailman/listinfo/colug-432
> >
>
>
>
> --
> -- R;   <><
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